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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

OGDEN CITt CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 15460

l./S •

BILL JUE PARKER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
i~ppellant

was convicted of being in actual

physical control cf a motor vehicle while under the
~f

inflJence
~ro~isionE

i11tox1cating liquor contrary to the

ct Section 14-15-1 of the Revised

,:;,_di1ca;ice; o:!:: Ogden City, 1964 Revision.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On April 26, 1977, Appellant was convicted
L1 ·>.rden City Court and sentenced to 180 days in jail.
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on the

Officer Carpenter observed a passenger in
the right front seat and another in the rear seat, but
testified that only the Appellant could have been
operating the accelerator pedal causing the "racing"
or "revving" of the vehicle's engine (T.24,29,30).
The officer's observations were made standing
immediately adjacent to the left front

(dr~ver's)

door of the vehicle, while looking directly at the
Appellant and speaking with him (T.24,25).

The police

officer noted that vehicle tracks in the fresh snow
led from the roadway to the vehicle's resting point
and that the damage to the sign was consistent with
the damage to the car (T.23).
The police officer testified that the car,
because of the sign stub and mud, could not have been
moved (T23,24,28,29).
As Appellant responded to Officer Carpenter's
request that he turn off the engine and exit the vehicle,
Officer Carpenter observed an open bottle of liquor
leaning against Appellant's side, which tipped over
and spilled on the front seat (T.27).

Once out of

the car, Appellant lost his balance and had to grab the
car door to stand up (T.26).

The officer had to "walk"
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him to the police vehicle, because " . . . he (Appellant)
was unable to walk by himselfa.

Each time Appellant

tried to walk alone he lost his balance (T.26).

The

Appellant was belligerent with the police officer,
calling him names (T.26).

The police officer testified

that without any question Appellant was intoxicated (T.26).
Appellant testified that he had had several drinks (T.35)
and that he " . . . might have been" under the influence
of intoxicants (T.33).
ARGUEMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
INTOXICATING LIQUOR.
While Appellant only addresses the issue of
"actual physical control of the vehicle", and in his brief
does not contradict the lower court's finding that
Appellant was "under the influence of dmtoxicating
liquor", Appellant does not admit thac he was, in fact,
"under the influence of intoxicating liquor".
The facts which collectively, but easily, lead
to the conclusion that Appellant was "under the influence"
are:

(1) his loss of balance upon exiting the vehicle;

(2) his inability to stand unassisted;

(3) his inability
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to walk;

(4) his belligerence with officer; (4) his open

bottle of liquor leaning against his side; (5)
Appellant's testimony that he had had several drinks and
"might have been" under the influence of intoxicants;
and (6) the officer's opinion that Appellant was drunk.
The finder-of-fact, Judge Calvin Gould (and
earlier Judge David Roth) , found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Appellant was under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.
On appeal, the evidence should be viewed in
the light most favorable to this verdict of conviction.
State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 341 P.2d 865 (1959);
State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P.2d 183 (1960).
The finder-of-fact, in this case the district court judge,
was in the best position to observe the facial expressions,
mannerisms and tone of voice of witnesses and thus was
in the best position to weigh the evidence.

Such

judgments are difficult, if not impossible to make on
appeal.

By examining the evidence, however, it is

obvious that the judge's verdict is heavily supported
by the evidence.

The verdict will not be overturned on

appeal unless it appears that the evidence was so
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inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds
must have entered reasonable doubts that the crime was
committed.

State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d

212 (1957); State v. Danks, 19 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d
146 (1960).

In other words, the strong presumption is

that the trial verdict is correct.

Appellant, to prevail,

has the burden to prove that the verdict was unreasonable,
and this he has not attempted whatsoever.
POINT II
DESPITE RELATIVE IMMOBILITY OF APPELLANT'S
MOTOR VEHICLE, APPELLANT WAS NEVERTHELESS IN ACTUAL
PHYSICAL CONTROL OF HIS MOTOR VEHICLE.
The facts of this case differ substantially
from those of the single Utah case, which discusses the
concept of "actual physical control".

In the Bugger

case, 25 Utah 2d 404, 483 P.2d 442, the defendant was
found asleep, his car off the main-traveled portion of
the roadway, and the engine was not running.

The court

specifically distinguished this from cases where the
engine of the vehicle was operating or the driver was
attempting to steer a moving vehicle.

Bugger, supra at

443.

-6-
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Assuming, arguendo, that the police officer
was correct in his conclusion that Appellant's car could
not be moved, was Appellant in actual physical control
through his actions of shifting gears, accelerating
the engine, and holding the steering wheel in an attempt
to "rock" the car loose?

The Bugger case, supra, at

443, seems to require that Appellant control the vehicle
or exercise dominion over it.

Respondent maintains that

Appellant's actions (hands on wheel, gear shifting, and
engine acceleration) do constitute control over the
vehicle or an exercise of dominion.

To buttress this

assertion Respondent now refers to other state appellate
decisions where the precise issue of actual physical control
over immobile vehicles has been decided.
In Gallagher v. Virginia, 205 Va.666, 139
S.E.2d 37 at 38, testimony showed that the defendant was
in the driver's seat of the car and accelerating the
motor.

The car had no traction and it would have been

impossible for the car to have moved by itself.

The

officer stated that when he arrived the wheel was touching
the ground, but only with slight traction and it was spinning.
The court, in upholding defendant's conviction for operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants,
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held that manipulating the mechanical or electrical
devices of the vehicle constituted operation of the
vehicle despite the clear immobility of the vehicle.
The court made favorable reference to Flournoy v. Georgia,
106 6a.App. 756, 128 S.E.2d 528; Iowa v. Webb, 202 Iowa
633, 210 N.W. 751; Commonwealth v. Uski, 263 Mass. 22,
160 N.E. 305, Delaware v. Pritchett, 3 Storey 583, 53 Del.
583, 173 A.2d 886; New Jersey v. Ray 4 N.J. Misc. 493,
133 A. 486; New York v. Domagala, 123 Misc. 757, 206 NYS
288; Conneticut v. Swift, 125 Conn. 399, 6A.2d 359; and
State v. Sweeney, 77 N.J. Super. 512, 187 A.2d 39.
In Arizona v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 274 p.2d 338
(1954), the defendant was charged with being in actual
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence.
The Arizona Court, echoing Justice Ellett's opinion in
the Bugger case, supra, at 443, stated:
The conclusion we draw therefrom
is that the legislature intended
the present law (adding the phrase
"being in actual physical control"
to the existing "driving" provision)
to embrace fact situations not
covered by the old, more particularly
the legislature intended the law
should apply to persons having con~r?l
of a vehicle while not actuall drivin
it or aving it in motion. ~· supra,
at 339. (Emphasis supplied.)

-8-
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In State v. Overbay, 206 N.W. 634, defendant
drunkenly slides his car into a ditch.

The Sheriff found

the defendant "at the wheel operating the engine, and
defendant and friend behind the car pushing the same;
in a joint effort to get the car out of the ditch."
The court observed, "For the purpose of a conviction,
it must be said that the operation of the engine in the
attempt to get the car back on the road was a violation
of the statute, even though it be true that he had not
operated the car prior to the accident." (Emphasis
supplied.)
In People v. Domagala, 123 Misc. 757, 206
NYS 288, the defendant was also attempting the impossible.
He had tried six times to drive up over a curb, but because
the front wheels were squarely against the curb, and the
car lacked sufficient power, the effort was futile; each
attempt resulted in a stalled engine.

The court expressly

rejected the notion that the law was not violated until
the car moved; and held that the defendant "began to
violate the law the instant he began to manipulate the
machinery of the motor for the purpose of putting the
automobile into motion."
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In State v. Storrs, 163 A. 560, the Supreme

Court of Vermont, the vehicle's motor could not be started,
although the "self-starter" was operational.

The court

held that "the turning of the ignition switch and the
effect of this upon the self-starter was an operation of
the car .

"
In Carter v. Texas, 353 S.W.2d 458, the court

found that evidence that defendant was seated behind
the steering wheel attempting to drive it from the
flooded ditch and that tire and skid marks led from
the broken barricade on the highway to the automobile,
was suff icent to show that defendant drove the automobile as alleged upon a public highway while intoxicated.
In Roberts v. Maine, 29 A2d 457, the Court
addressed this issue:
Is one who sits behind the
steering wheel of an automobile
with the motor running and the car
in gear and the rear wheels
spinning and swerving slightly
from side to side, while the front
end of the motor vehicle is
suspended in the air five or six
inches so that the turning of
the steering wheel cannot
control the direction or
course of the motor vehicle
and the front end of the
motor vehicle chained to the
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rear of a truck ahead being
towed by the vehicle ahead
guilty of operating a moto;
vehicle under this statute?
The court answered affirmatively by endorsing
the disputed instruction to the jury:
. . . if you believe that
(the defendant) was behind
the wheel and put the motor
in motion, had placed the car
in gear, that the rear wheels,
because of the motor being in
motion, were whizzing, or
something, and that the rear
of that car swayed sideways
(then you shall find that
defendant) . • • was
operating that car."
(Parenthetical phrase mine.)
In Commonwealth v. Clarke, 150 N.E. 829, the
Massachusetts Court held that the defendant by
manipulating the gears of a vehicle (with the engine
off), which permitted it to move forward by its own
weight and strike another vehicle, was guilty of operating
a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

This case is

dissimilar in that the defendant's engine was not running,
as was Appellant's engine in our case.

However, the

striking similarity is the natural effect of gravity.
Whereas, the Massachusetts' defendant's car went three
or four feet down hill at the command of gravity, our
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Appellant's car mired itself in the mud with the help
of gravity and spinning rear wheels.
In contradiction of all of the above cases is
a single 1929 Pennsylvania case where defendant tried
to operate a vehicle with a broken drive shaft.
Commonwealth v. Fox, 17 DC 491 (Penn. 1929).

The court

found that because the shaft was broken there was not
the requisite control, but the Court noted:
This is a very close case,
and as the rule of law is
that the benefit of the doubt
should always be given to the
defendant, we feel that . . .
it is doubtful if the defendant
was the operator of the car
within the meaning of the
statute.
But the court did order the defendant to pay
the costs in the case.
Although the issue of operating an immobile
(or rocking) vehicle has not yet been decided in Utah,
it is clear that where other states lexcept Pennsylvania)
have confronted the issue, they have found the defendant
to have been operating or in actual physical control
of the vehicle even though the vehicle could not be moved.

-12-
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Respondent also believes that it is important
to remember that the uncontradicted testimony is that
property damage did occur as the extrication attempt
was being made; "It was digging up the lawn . • . quite
badly." (T.25).

And even though the rocking may not

have produced perceptible movement forward or backwards,
the car obviously went downwards.
POINT III
THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE DEFENSE OF IMPOSSIBILITY
(OR IMMOBILITY) WOULD BE AN EFFRONT TO REASON,
REHABILITATION AND JUSTICE.
There is no reasonable doubt that Appellant was
intoxicated; there is further no doubt that he was
exerting his best efforts to move his vehicle.

To

absolve him from responsibility solely because his wheels
were mired would be wrong.
In the A.L.I. Model Penal Code, Tenative Draft
No. 10 (1960), under Article 5, Inchoate Crimes, the
A.L.I. noted:
. • . conduct designed to cause
or culminate in the commission
of a crime obviously yields an
indication that the actor is
disposed towards such activity,
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If movement alone is the factor upon which this case is
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to be decided
~cts

(to the exclusion of all other operational

hy Appellant), the Court will find itself deciding

how many inches or feet up, down, sidewards, forwards,

or backwards constitutes "movement".

A much more

reasonable standard would proceed from the finding that
defendant was intoxicated (or "under the influence")
and that he did everything he could physically do with
his vehicle to move it, and that his failure to move
i:J10

v·eh•)_c·"Le,

except deeper into the earth, did

constitute "actual physical control".
Di.sti~

j_ct Courts'

The City and

decisions should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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